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viruses	 raise	 concerns	 among	 poultry	 producers,	 wildlife	
biologists,	aviculturists,	and	public	health	personnel	world-
wide.	 Surveillance,	 modeling,	 and	 experimental	 research	
will	provide	the	knowledge	required	for	intelligent	policy	and	
management	decisions.
The recent introduction of highly pathogenic avian in-fluenza (HPAI) subtype H5N8 virus into Europe and 
North America poses major risks to poultry industries, 
zoologic collections, and wildlife populations; thus, this 
introduction warrants continued and heightened vigilance. 
First discovered in early 2014 in poultry and wild birds in 
South Korea, HPAI H5N8 virus apparently arose in China 
from reassortment events between HPAI subtype H5N1 vi-
rus (clade 2.3.4.4) and several low pathogenicity viruses 
(LPAIVs) (1–3). The H5N8 virus was subsequently detect-
ed in waterfowl in Russia in September 2014, and since 
then, H5N8 virus and reassortants have been detected in 
poultry and wild birds in Europe (Netherlands, Germany, 
Italy, the United Kingdom, Hungary, and Sweden), Tai-
wan, Japan, Canada (British Columbia), and the western 
and central United States (Washington, Oregon, California, 
Idaho, Utah, Minnesota, Missouri, Arkansas, Kansas, Iowa, 
Wyoming, and Montana).
Wild waterfowl are a primary natural host for LPAIVs, 
and infection rates in these populations peak at autumn mi-
gratory staging locations, where large numbers of immu-
nologically naive juvenile birds congregate (4). The HPAI 
H5N8 virus has apparently adapted to wild waterfowl 
hosts: few or no clinical signs or adverse effects are ap-
parent in these hosts when infected with the virus. Thus, it 
seems probable that the virus was disseminated out of Rus-
sia into Europe, East Asia, and North America by migrating 
waterfowl during autumn 2014 (5).
The HPAI H5N8 virus has encountered, interacted 
with, and reassorted with co-circulating LPAIVs in migra-
tory and overwintering waterfowl populations, creating 
new HPAI viruses (HPAIVs). In Taiwan, new Eurasian lin-
eage reassortant HPAIVs (i.e., H5N2 and H5N3 subtypes) 
and the parental H5N8 subtype virus have been detected in 
poultry and wild birds (6). In North America, HPAI H5N8 
virus continues to circulate among waterfowl and commer-
cial and backyard poultry flocks. In addition, new HPAIV 
reassortants (i.e., H5N2 and H5N1 subtypes) that are com-
binations of HPAI H5N8 virus and genetic elements from 
Eurasian and North American viruses are also circulating 
in these populations (7,8) (Figure).
Persistence of the original HPAI H5N8 virus for >1 
year, the creation of multiple reassortant viruses that have 
maintained high pathogenicity in poultry, and adaptation of 
the virus to migrating waterfowl all indicate that these vi-
ruses could persist and spread in Northern Hemisphere wa-
terfowl populations for an extended period. This dynamic 
of HPAIVs being transported by wild birds to new popula-
tions raises critical issues and poses a series of questions 
that researchers and modelers should examine in more de-
tail. The risks are significant that these HPAIVs will con-
tinue to circulate and that new genetic combinations will 
arise in concentrations of overwintering waterfowl and 
then spill over into poultry operations and aviculture. The 
spillover risk is particularly high for operations with ru-
dimentary biosafety practices (e.g., backyard flocks) and 
that trend toward outdoor access for organic poultry. Such 
events have already occurred in commercial poultry opera-
tions in Canada and some US states (California, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Iowa, and Arkansas), and subsequent culling op-
erations and trade restrictions have caused substantial local 
economic losses. As wild birds begin their spring migra-
tions and disperse into their breeding ranges, will they be 
transporting these viruses to new regions, including the rest 
of North America? Is this an inevitable outcome of HPAI 
H5N8 transmission in wild bird populations? Can these vi-
ruses be transported from Europe to eastern North America 
by migratory birds via North Atlantic routes (9)? Are there 
risks of these viruses reassorting with viruses from other 
species, such as swine, particularly feral swine whose pop-
ulations are rapidly expanding, and will these reassortant 
viruses present greater risk of zoonotic disease?
These HPAIVs do not appear to pose substantial risks 
to waterfowl populations, but they may have detrimental 
effects on other, perhaps more sensitive, wildlife popula-
tions. Birds of prey seem to be particularly susceptible to 
HPAIV infection (10), including the HPAIV H5N8 vi-
rus that killed captive gyrfalcons (Falco rusticolus) that 








were fed infected duck carcasses (7). In North America, 
other raptor species have been found infected with H5N8 
or H5N2 virus: Cooper’s hawk (Accipiter cooperii), great 
horned owl (Bubo virginianus), red-tailed hawk (Buteo ja-
maicensis), peregrine falcon (Falco peregrinus), and bald 
eagle (Haliaeetus leucocephalus). It is not known what 
effect these viruses will have on small, at-risk wild bird 
populations, such as California condors (Gymnogyps cali-
fornianus), that may prey on or scavenge infected birds, but 
the possible effects should be considered in conservation 
management decisions.
As HPAIVs continue spreading and evolving, the 
questions posed here, along with many more questions, 
will need to be answered to understand the risks to agri-
culture, zoologic collections, wildlife, and, potentially, 
human populations. As other researchers have recently 
pointed out, robust, targeted surveillance programs among 
wild birds (11) and poultry, modeling of the movements 
of HPAIV-infected wild birds, and experimental research 
studies will provide the knowledge required for intelligent 
policy and management decisions regarding agriculture, 
wildlife, and public health.
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Figure.	Genealogy	of	subtype	H5N8	HPAIV,	its	spread	from	China	
to	other	countries,	and	its	evolution	in	wild	birds.	Stars	represent	
probable	spread	of	virus	and/or	reassortment	in	wild	birds;	
question	marks	indicate	unknown	mode.	GER,	Germany;	HPAIV,	
highly	pathogenic	avian	influenza	virus;	ITA,	Italy;	LPAIVs,	low	
pathogenicity	avian	influenza	viruses;	Neth,	the	Netherlands;	UK,	
United	Kingdom;	US,	United	States.
